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Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
The paper analyses governance in the parliamentary boards using a quali-quantitative 
research. The analysis is based on corporate governance to identifying differences 
and similarities on public governance in the Legislative Power. We collected data from 
several different types of parliamentary boards. A quantitative and comparative model is 
presented to assert the level and kind of governance in legislative bodies, specifically the 
type of governance exerted by parliament’s boards. Findings reveal great heterogeneities 
demonstrating that each parliament comes up with a specific solution for its governance 
problems. The main theoretical contribution of the paper is that the legislative power is so 
idiosyncratic to copy standardized solutions.
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Governança no Poder Legislativo: um olhar para as mesas dos parlamentos
O artigo analisa a governança em parlamentos, com uso de métodos quali-quantitativos. 
A análise parte de conceitos de governança corporativa, para identificar diferenças e 
semelhanças com o processo de governança pública no Poder Legislativo. Foram coletados 
dados a respeito de diversas mesas diretoras em parlamentos. Um modelo quantitativo e 
qualitativo é desenvolvido para avaliar o nível e o tipo de governança em corpos legislativos, 
especificamente o tipo de governança exercido pelas mesas diretoras. Os achados 
demonstram grande heterogeneidade, revelando que cada parlamento desenvolve uma 
solução própria para suas questões de governança. A principal contribuição teórica é que o 
Poder Legislativo necessita de soluções específicas de governança, dadas suas idiossincrasias.
Palavras-chave: poder legislativo, governança, administração pública
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Gobernanza en el Poder Legislativo: una mirada a las mesas de los parlamentos
El artículo analiza la gobernanza en parlamentos, con el uso de métodos cuantitativos. El 
análisis parte de conceptos de gobierno corporativo, para identificar diferencias y semejanzas 
con el proceso de gobierno público en el Poder Legislativo. Se recogieron datos sobre 
varias mesas directivas en parlamentos. Un modelo cuantitativo y cualitativo se desarrolla 
para evaluar el nivel y el tipo de gobernanza en cuerpos legislativos, específicamente el 
tipo de gobernanza ejercido por las mesas directivas. Los hallazgos demuestran gran 
heterogeneidad, revelando que cada parlamento desarrolla una solución propia para sus 
cuestiones de gobernanza. La principal contribución teórica es que el Poder Legislativo 
necesita soluciones específicas de gobernanza, dadas sus idiosincrasias.
Palabras clave: poder legislativo, gobernanza, administración pública
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Introduction
This paper aims to shed an investigative glance over the Legislative Power 
governance, as a branch of the public administration, focusing particularly the 
issue of the directorate board in parliamentary institutions. The investigation seeks 
to understand the governance phenomenon in the Legislative Power under two 
perspectives: political and managerial. The emphasis on the role of the board is 
due to the fact that this is the locus of the governance processes, according to the 
literature. Besides, classical studies about parliament and its institutionalization 
processes, such as Polsby (1968), suggests that the boards are important as indicator 
of the differentiation between the organization and its environment. For so doing, we 
undertook a comparative analysis combining quantitative and qualitative methods.
In this paper, we aim to answer the following research question: what is the role 
of the directorate board in the parliament governance? To this end, we carried out 
the investigation with some differentiating perspectives and some advancements 
on theory and practice. The differentiating perspectives are related to the objective 
of analyzing public administration in the Legislative Power institutions emphasizing 
aspects of governance. The Legislative Power, although inserted in the government 
strategic core, is widely underexplored in academic studies in the field of public 
administration, although there are some specific aspects of the legislative public 
administration. Another perspective that differentiates this research from others is 
that it aims to demonstrate how governance systems affect the dynamic of other 
sectors of the Legislative House. As a contribution, we developed a two-dimensional 
model to classify the legislative houses according to the role of the directorate board 
in the governance system. The model allows an easy understanding, comparative 
analysis, and the depicting alternatives for improvement. In addition, the model 
allows generalization on replicating this framework to similar studies on other 
organizations. More than distinguish between boards that were responsible for 
legislative process (e.g. a rules committee) versus those responsible for internal 
expenditure and operations (e.g. a board of an internal economy), this is a tentative 
to show how Boards affects the general guidance in the Houses. And the scenarios 
developed try to show a political inclination vis a vis an administrative perspective.
The history of legislative body boards is as old as the history of the democratic 
gatherings. It is based on the remote notion that there isn’t vacuum in power, 
associated to the material impossibility of keeping an assembly gathered all the 
time. There are some interpretations that the mythologies and its pantheons have 
inspired the men imprinting mental models that shaped, structured and energized 
people’s life allowing the construction of meaning systems (Keane, 2010). The gods 
gathered for making decisions and there were the circle of the most powerful deities, 
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who were in charge to decide about what decisions should be made. In the case of 
people from Syria and Mesopotamia, for instance, “there was about fifty gods and 
goddesses, but the most important instructions were set down in small assemblies 
of seven” (Keane, 2010, p. 132, free translation)1. The competence of deciding what 
should be decided (agenda setting) is of great importance, especially in the political 
houses in which the power to establishing the agenda is very relevant.
Immerse in mystical thoughts, those people assumed that imitating the self-
government methods of their deities was a mean for absorbing their qualities. Due 
to this, they emulated the process of gathering together to make collective decisions. 
From compromises reached by consensus, the prevalent power reproduced the 
religious structure of the pantheon through transfiguration mechanisms.
In Athens, the democratic experience of the antiquity became more famous, 
there was the Council of the Five Hundred, which was permanent, while the 
assembly was normally gathered for just one day, forty times a year, ten days in 
a row, or about four times a month in the Athenian civil calendar of ten months 
(Keane, 2010). This Council of Five Hundred, labeled as Boulé, had the responsibility 
of organizing the agenda to be discussed by the assembly, and, it was responsible 
for conducting the work. Furthermore, it was also responsible for overseeing the 
Ekklesia decisions.
When the parliaments became common in Europe, around the 17 century, with 
the summon of Lion Courts in March 1188, by Alfonso IX, the practice of boards also 
came back – “the courts appointed a committee, the disputación permanente, which 
had the functions of monitoring the management of public funds and ensuring that 
the laws were equally complied by the Crown and by its subjects” (Keane, 2010, p. 
185, free translation). Created for the interregnum, the boards are the parliaments 
in vigilando. From this historic beginning they remain as a fundamental element of 
the Legislative Power governance. 
Theoretical framework
In this research we employ knowledge from the organizational institutionalism 
(Aguilera; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera; Jackson, 2003; Capron; Guillén, 
2009; Enrione; Mazza; Zerboni, 2006; Zattoni; Cuomo, 2008), which has in its 
concerns the diffusion of organizational practices and the issue of legitimacy, being 
governance a strong legitimating element for the institutions. These institutions as 
1 Jacobsen (1943, 168) provides another example for the deific circles and explores the translation of these 
concepts to the politic world: “the fifty senior gods sat down, and the seven gods of fates fixed fates for Markuk 
[…] translating these mythical concepts into ‘political’ terms, we must define the seven gods ‘who determine 
destiny’ as gods whose words are ‘authoritative’ or ‘decisive’”.
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social structures are embedded in wider institutional and legal arrays in which both 
the result of the organizational practices, and the articulation axis for legitimacy are 
highly contingent (Rossoni; Machado da Silva, 2010). 
Somehow, the paper dialogues with the institutionalism literature. There are 
evidences of path dependence in the boards trajectory, as demonstrated by Braga, 
Sathler and Miranda (2016). And one of the points of the argument is just that 
institutions matters, or, that the boards, as institutions, matters. This perspective 
can be found in Hall and Taylor (2003) and in March and Olsen (1995). When 
comparing parliaments and companies, there is also a good proxy in the work of 
Weingast and Marshall (1988). But the choice is to explore more the administration 
perspective, or organizational institutionalism.
Taking into account the governance concept originated in the business sector, the 
high majority of studies have concentrated on the agency problem of the relationship 
between agent (CEO), and principal (shareholders). In the particular case of the 
public sector, this sort of questions needs to be seen as multilevel. For this reason 
it is important to investigate the means of incorporating business-based governance 
practices in public sector institutions, particularly in parliaments. The understanding 
of the role of directorate boards in the parliament governance processes requires 
retrieving well defined concepts from the business sector in order to calibrate the 
necessary adaptations to the field of legislative public administration. 
In the private sector, governance is defined as a set of juridical, cultural, and 
institutional frames that defines what the company can do, who is entitled for 
making decisions, the way power is exercised and the amount of risks and incomes 
involved in the activities (Blair, 1995).
The single replacement of the word “company” for “parliament”, in our vision, 
is enough for making the application feasible for our study. The “Instituto Brasileiro 
de Governança Corporativa” (Brazilian Institute for Corporate Governance - IBGC) 
provides a wider concept for governance: “a system through which organizations 
are managed, overseen and induced involving the relationship among owners, 
administrative board, directorate, and control bodies” (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Governança Corporativa,  2009, p. 19, free translation). 
According to Matias-Pereira (2010, p. 224, free translation), “the analysis of the 
causes that led to conception and application of the corporative governance to the 
public sector is an evidence that the Brazilian State is trying improve its organization 
in order to make it more efficient and effective”. This challenge became more 
important and timely in the extent that countries have been facing difficulties from 
the increase in the service and public policies demand, and a decrease in the tax 
collection (fiscal crisis). The “Tribunal de Contas da União” (Brazilian Federal Court 
of Accounts – TCU), in recent publication about public sector governance, suggests, 
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“governance in the public sector encompasses the mechanisms of leadership, 
strategy, and control put to practice for assessing, orienting, monitoring managerial 
performance, looking at conducing public policies, and the delivery of service of 
interest of the society” (Brasil, 2013, p. 26,  free translation). In sum, governance is 
the governmental policies modus operandi. 
Besides governance being a concept and not a managerial technology, we 
understand that its transposition to the public world should be done according to 
a process of managerial reduction, as suggested by Bergue (2011). That means the 
concept needs to be grasped in its substance (content), recreated and resignified 
through a reflection on its assumptions generating a new synthesis (use to the public 
sector). In this study, we also intend to propose a contribution by “undertaking a 
wide reflection process about the essential content of the cultural objectives being 
transplanted” (Bergue, 2011, p. 316,  free translation), particularly in the case of the 
governance concept. Parliaments are complex institutions and its operations are 
determined by a set of juridical frameworks, and cultural and institutional arrays. As 
a kind of public institutions, parliaments are subject to the scrutiny of the society. 
Furthermore, they encompass agency-based relationships, which seems the case 
of the relationship between politicians and managers, and between managers and 
other employees.
An essential difference between public and private governance is that in the private 
sector there is an ethos with no publicist content – the aim of aggregating economic 
value is eminently instrumental2. In the public sector, publicity is the main orientation 
and the governance process should be finalistic (Simões, 2003). In parliaments, the 
legitimacy requirements of the decisions orbit around the public interest and around 
the process of formation and expression of the institutional will.
Private enterprises are voluntary associations of natural people and all other 
people and entities [stakeholders] that come across with the corporation do it in 
voluntary way. Public institutions, as parliaments, operate under a special apparatus 
with instrumental authority enacted by the State. The challenge of the governance 
in such cases is to find the means for improving the probability for the institution 
functions in ways that are not inconsistent with its main public objectives. The 
public governance model needs to articulate the institutional-administrative, the 
socio-politics, and the economic-financial dimensions in order for the managerial 
process and the institutional functioning contributes to the materialization of the 
2 In spite of the social responsibility rhetoric and of the stakeholder theory approach  “at the end, the highest 
motivation for demanding a ethic-moral behavior from managers, in a higher scope rather than the exclusive 
segment of the people making actions, it to generate more wealthy to the company” (Simões, 2003, p. 46, free 
translation).
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democracy as a collective patrimony. Worthy to recall that in the genesis of the 
governance concept there are structural and functional concepts of the capabilities 
system (Santos, 1997). 
The higher level of the hierarchy and the decision system related to it is the focus 
of the governance. It is at the organization’s apex that we can assess the whole 
scope of the governance concept. However, if in the private world one of the main 
governance questions is related to sharing authority between the administrative 
board and the CEO, on one side, and stockholders, on the other side3; in the case 
of parliaments the emphasis is placed over the separation between political control 
and administrative control, which is the core of the model.
The directorate board plays a central role in the relationship between politics 
and administration. The parliamentary systems have peculiar characteristics that 
contribute to stress the importance of the boards: existence-occurrence4, isegory 
and collective decision-making. These features will defend representative’s interests 
(politics) before bureaucracy (administrative), and parliaments before society. As a 
result, the governance exerted by the boards has as an object the nature of the 
interactions and relationships between the Institution and its multiples stakeholders 
in the decision-making processes, and control over institutional resources. The 
boards need to solve coordination problems, as well as managing uncertainty, which 
are big in complex institutions such as parliaments while copying with strategic 
decisions. Its role, therefore, is to provide solutions for the problems, to reduce 
complexity, to create accountability and to facilitate cooperation and coordination 
among stakeholders. In this sense, the boards works similarly to administrative 
boards in corporations in terms of governance perspectives according to the extant 
literature (Van Ees; Gabrielsson; Huse, 2009, p. 308).
Consistent with this idea in terms of the role of the boards, according to Van 
Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse (2009, p. 309), it can be defined as “mediating between 
various coalitions of internal and external actors and establishing controls to ensure 
that organizational effort is directed toward achieving the goals that the dominant 
coalition has set”. In the case of parliaments, coalitions can be seen as composed 
by political parties in order to be able to take power of the house.
The functioning of the boards also correspond to the administrative boards 
of corporations pointed out by scholars in the field (Van Ees; Gabrielsson; Huse, 
2009). The board does not base its decision-making in a general calculus that takes 
3 Retrieving the dichotomy between ownership and control.
4 Besides the existence, from a ontological view point, the parliament, from a functional view point, exists while is 
gathered – “Parliament is not yet either an institution or a body: it is an occasion” (Polsby, 1975, p. 290)
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into consideration all possible consequences for its decisions. It usually operates in 
a problem occurrence modus operandi. Where an issue is detected, the board starts 
the search for solutions, which usually is closed as soon as a satisfactory solution 
is found (Hendry, 2002, 2005). In such process, board members take advantage 
of routines and heuristic that offer available feasible solutions, as well as the 
procedures through which decision are to be implemented (Ocasio, 1999; Zahra; 
Filatotchev, 2004). According to Polsby (1975), 
[…] mostly, alternatives are sharply attenuated by customary practice. 
Deliberation is a process by which the proper customary solutions are 
invoked and legitimized, that is, found, not invented, and analogies between 
precedents and contemporary circumstances are discovered and certified 
(Polsby, 1975, p. 273).
Where there is a conflict between board members, the solution is the result of a 
continuous political bargaining process (Huse; Rindova, 2001; Pearce, 1995).
Besides the similarity with corporation’s administrative boards in their functioning 
aspects, in the case of parliaments it is difficult to reach a consensus about the best 
interest of the Institution due to own meaning of the word “parties”, which is “be part 
of”, one faction. Therefore, value issues need to be balanced according to the coalitions 
of stakeholders to be taken into account. The “best interest of the Institution” is 
defined and redefined constantly through a permanent political negotiation process. 
Conflict is inherent to the limitation of the available utilities, which generated the 
circumstance that the satisfaction of a given interest implies into the sacrifice of an 
opponent interest. One board inside the parliament is not simply the result of the will 
and intention of association between political parties, but an exercise in which every 
party seeks to adequate its interests, no coincident, to the needs of the Institution. 
This perspective is associated with one tenet of the governance concept – an interest 
intermediation system or a reference of the systemic and institutional conditions 
under which the exercise of power comes about.
Worthy to notice the difficulty of bearing in mind that the institutional interests 
do not withdraw the compromise of its members with this attempt, because there 
are concepts of justice, social function, duties and other responsibilities which have 
to be taken into account under moral and ethics umbrella. That means, yet the 
competence of the boards are strictly regulated, which is the case of the Brazilian 
Parliament, an eventual application of Law principles in the concrete case requires 
the observance of ethics and moral as requirements for legitimacy. These are the 
ethics-moral concepts that will beacon the framework for the collective interests. 
This is true because a direct assessment of the compliance of the decisions with the 
collective interest is unattainable.
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Another important dimension in the researches involving administrative boards 
is its composition. We hereby discuss about these issues in the perspective of the 
directorate boards. The acquaintanceship in the board while is a long-term relationship 
requires a continuing effort where the common objective should be projected over 
the members. According to Simões (2003, p. 49, free translation), from the roots of 
the classic Roman Law, “the exigency of perseverance in a given social agreement 
result in a need of good faith”. Arrow (1974) mentioned ethics and morality as 
invisible institutions, which works as conscious and unconscious agreements likely to 
generate multiple benefices. Participating as a board member requires investing on 
time both working as a board member, and as trying to figure out the institution and 
its issues. Participation will be as desirable as the greater the reputation effect and the 
contribution of this for the representative career (Polsby, 1975).
The presence of the representative in the board can be strongly motivated 
by personal issues. There is a differentiated status resulting from the possibility 
of having additional funds (staff, office etc), and more visibility (appearing more 
frequently on the media = more votes)5. However, we can expect that board 
members have higher sensibility to the media. And it could happen either due to 
higher exposition, or by the fact that it is easier to focus in an individual rather 
than on the parliament as a whole. The increasing pressure exerted by society 
also contributes to the aversion of the members to make any decision that is likely 
to cause negative reactions from the media.
It is also not possible to identify if the size of the boards has impact on their 
performance6. Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) pointed out a mathematical 
way7 for measuring the balance between more or less members in a corporation 
administrative board. Having larger tables is a almost natural consequence of the 
5  The desire to have a place at the board exclusively for status issues and the lack of conscience about intrinsic 
responsibilities are damaging factors that highly contribute to leaving aside the collective interest.
6  Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) point out a survey carried out with 81 enterprizes revealed a tendency 
to maintaining the size of their administrative boards. In1935, the average was of 11 members; in 1960, 15, and 
in 2000 11 again. Their research also suggest that a tendency of homogenizing these boards due to the standard 
deviation observed in the period (1935-2000), which goes from 5.5 to 2.7.
7  Given: C(n) – the cost of having n members; sp – the probability of a given member points out an issue, where s 
is a measurement of institutional simplicity and p is constant, we have that the Institution chooses the number 
of members in order to maximize (1) 91 – (1 – sp)n) – C(n)* The cross partial derivative of (1) with respect to s  is 
n and: (2) (1 – sp)n-1p + n(1 – sp)n-1log(1-sp)p . Which has the same meaning of (3) 1 + nlgo (1 – sp). If sp > 0,632 
or to n larger enough, the marginal return of increasing the amount of members is decreasing in relation to the 
simplicity of the Institution. Hall, Johnson, and Haas (1967) affirmed the organization’s complexity indicator is 
given by the degree of internal segmentation, measured by the general division of the work, specific division of 
the work, hierarchical differentiation and special dispersion. * Without loosing generalization, the probability of 
an existent problem multiplied was normalized and multiplied by the benefice of amending it to 1.
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fact that social groups need progressively of coalitions to keep the stability in larger 
groups (Dunbar, 1998). 
Taking into account vertical and horizontal dimensions of governance proposed 
by Roe (2005), we can assume that parliaments realities become closer to the 
vertical one. The horizontal dimension of governance relates to controls exerted by 
organs and peers in the same hierarchical level. In the vertical dimension, mainly 
a higher-level organ in the hierarchy exerts the control. It is the kind of disperse 
property where there is no predominant actor. In such situation, the main objective 
of the governance is to ensure that the board and the directors act according to the 
institution best interest, besides being competent enough for managing it. Once we 
assume that this alignment doesn’t come about spontaneously (agency problem), 
there is a need of creating institutional mechanisms for doing so. 
In the particular case of the parliaments the alignment is ensured through 
regulations and by act of the Constitution. If we consider, even when distributive 
justice principles are in place, the existence of a predominant actor (political party 
or a coalition of parties), the horizontal dimension of the governance is visible in 
which institutional artifacts and mechanisms are set down to mitigating self-interest 
actions of the dominant group. The boards face the challenge of establishing a 
equity relation between the elements quantitatively and qualitatively unequal, that 
means majority and minority, without loosing, however, the golden rule on the 
preponderance of collective decisions of the majority decisions. Simões (2003) recalls 
the Anglo-Saxon Law to recognize the existence of a kind of fiduciary relationship 
between majority and minority in the exercise of power by the majority. The later 
has the responsibility of ensuring by the minority interests under the risk of, in the 
case of violation of this fiduciary right, having the abrogation of the deliberation. 
Parliaments are places where the general will is formed, which reinforce the 
expectation that the acting of the institution is legitimate. The tenets that rules 
governance, in parliament houses, are provided of strong normative content 
clearly turned to the insurance of the minorities’ participation8. Only in this way 
its functioning can be regarded as legitimate. According to Stanfield and Carroll 
(2004), power has to do with legitimacy, which means acting according to dominant 
rules and regulations and with transparency. This perspective also relates to the 
democracy dimension, because in a democratic environment – assumption of 
the parliamentary boards functioning – no actor should be able to intervene in 
order to revert the results of the formal process. Every interest should be equally 
submitted to competition in what has called by Przeworski as institutionalization 
8 The Stature of the Brazilian Senate, for instance, on its final part sets down the “General Principles of the Legislative 
Power”, of normative content and turned to ensure the legitimacy in the elaboration of the ‘legal norm’. 
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of the uncertainty (Przeworski, 2000). Given such circumstances, in the boards 
of parliaments, more than that in the administrative boards of private companies, 
the formation of the collective will should come about by the vote, with the 
manifestation of each and “the votes are blended as support for the deliberation” 
(Simões, 2003, p. 20, free translation).
It is worthy to highlight that these rules (institutional artifacts and mechanisms) 
transcend the efficiency of the management as it involves cultural and political 
aspects under which the practice of the governance is configured (North, 1990). 
Components such as the level of the intensification of the political debate; the 
existence predominant coalitions; shared beliefs; social expectations; rules of 
social cohesion; regimental rules converge toward this structural configuration 
of the governance in parliaments. We also have to bear in mind “democratic 
governance does not lead to good governance. At best, it provides the basis for 
it” (Agere, 2000, p. 94). 
The theoretical framework aimed to demonstrate similarities and differences 
between legislative and company’s administrative boards in order to offer a overall 
understanding about the role of the boards in the governance system of legislative 
houses. We stressed the legislative board as the locus of mediation between 
political and administrative, fundamental and present dichotomy of the legislative 
public administration. For this reason, we hereby undertake a two-dimensions 
classification of legislative houses according to the role of their boards.
Methods
This investigation uses the comparative approach with the help of quantitative 
methods for collecting and analyzing data, though some analytical methods could 
be regarded as qualitative. Data was collected by structured questionnaires in which 
the respondent provided information about the identification of the institution 
and eleven close-ended questions in which they could provide some additional 
comments.
We sent 271 questionnaires to House of Representatives or equivalents, and to 
Senates or equivalents in Portuguese, English, Spanish, and French. The universe of 
the respondents was based on the list of members of the Interparliamentary Union 
(IPU). The number of returned questionnaires was 32 from 31 countries, which 
represented a response rate of 11%. In terms of continents, the sample comprises 
information from 22 Europeans countries, six Americans, two Asians, and one 
African. From the 32 legislative houses, 13 corresponded to unicameral parliaments 
(Portugal, Maldives, Luxemburg, Guatemala, Georgia, Ghana, Finland, Estonia, 
Croatia, Costa Rica, Chipper, Bulgaria e Andorra), eight are of Chamber of Deputies 
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(Germany/Bundestag, Argentina, Bolivia, Canada/House of Commons, Slovenia, 
France, Poland, and the United Kingdom), seven corresponded to the Senate / High 
Chamber or Federal Council (Germany/Bundesrat, Belgian, Byelorussia, Canada, 
Chile, Italy, and Japan), three are of countries that have bicameral systems and 
whose answers referred to the Parliament (Austria, Bosnia e Herzegovina e Ireland/
Houses of the Oireachtas).
The questionnaire generated discreet quantitative variables, and nominal 
qualitative variables. The first section of the questionnaire, which aimed to 
the identification of the respondent, contributed to the understanding of the 
organizational form of each legislative house theme scarcely explored in the 
literature. Focusing on the institutional aspects, the research develops a dialog 
with classical studies, such as Polsby (1968), who analyzed the institutionalization 
process of the United States Congress; and Huitt (1979), who attempted to assimilate 
Congress to the Organization Theory. It is clear that in both cases the assumption 
that both the administrative organization, and the institutional configuration affect 
the political system, and this is the relevance of their studies. It is from Polsby (1968, 
p. 165) the following statement: “it is hard – indeed for the contemporary observer, 
impossible – to shake the conviction that the House’s institutional structure does 
matter greatly in the production of political outcomes”.
Bearing in mind the adopted research protocol – structured questionnaire sent 
to respondents in the form of census with no control of responses – the sample 
could be classified as accidental, which makes generalization a bit harder. The 
literature, however, regards this type of approach as a valid one because it deals 
with a small population and because of the researchers’ profile, all experienced 
officers of the Legislative Power, and having discretion for judging the validity of 
the findings (Barbetta, 2008). The research approach is the descriptive one with 
data organization, presentation, and systematization. The focus is oriented towards 
the governance concept and its transposition to the public sphere starting from a 
critical thinking about its assumptions. 
In the universe of the parliaments, the emphasis is placed on the separation 
of the political control from the administrative control. Given that the Directorate 
Board plays a central role in this relationship politics versus administrative, this 
investigation is based on a spatial model proposed by the researchers, which consists 
in categorizing governance of the responding institutions according to the politics 
and administrative perspectives identified in the declaration of competencies of 
each respective directorate boards. Such perspectives were combined into four 
scenarios, as follows for proposing a good definition of administrative and politics 
perspectives. What we consider in each is the political-partisanship articulation 
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(political perspective), in which we focus on what defines the organization’s aims, 
and budget (administrative perspective):
• Scenario 1: weak/absent/timid governance, when the declaration of 
competences of the directorate board is reduced in terms of the number of 
competences, semantically generic and do not differentiate political from 
administrative activities.
• Scenario 2: politicized governance, when board directorate set of tasks 
besides the attributions related to conducting the legislative process and 
the political-partisanship articulation (political perspective), with more 
emphasis on those activities related to strategy such as budget activities 
(administrative perspective). In such cases, and in general, there is a director 
body with limited autonomy for performing diverse administrative tasks. 
However, the main decisions are taken by the board and, therefore, strongly 
influenced by political orientations.
• Scenario 3: managerial/strategic/supervision governance, where in the 
set of tasks performed by the Directorate Board there is a prevalence of 
tasks related to conducting the legislative process, and to the political-
partisanship articulation (political perspective). In this case, and in general, 
one director body with wide autonomy for performing administrative tasks 
with power to make decision based on efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
(administrative perspective).
• Scenario 4: hybrid/strong governance, when in the Directorate Board set of 
tasks there is a balance between political and administrative competences. 
In this case, the composition of the board can admit the presence of the 
administrative area for representation and with voting power. 
Based on the semantic content of the declared competences, we ranked 
each competence by assessing their association to political and administrative 
perspectives according to the following scale: 0 – absence of the factor; 0,5 – 
factor partially present; 1 – factor clearly present. This analysis resulted into a 
two-dimensions matrix in which the administrative and political perspectives 
are combined in maturity quadrants for representing the scenarios above. The 
classifications were carried out by each author and after that consolidated in a face-
by-face meeting in order to mitigate subjectivity.
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Results
Structures and designation
The title of the parliamentary boards per si is embedded in the administrative 
versus politics dichotomy, which is explored by the model we use in this 
investigation. There are names that suggest the predominance of one of the 
roles above the other. The administrative role for instance is quite visible in 
the cases of “Parliamentary Administration” (Austria); “Standing Committee 
on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration” (Senate of Canada); “Board 
of Internal Economy” (Chamber of Canada); ”Comisión de Régimen Interior” 
(Senate of Chile)”. More generic designations, such as “Secretariat” (Bundesrat, 
Germany), “Presidium” (Byelorussia), “Collegium” (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
points toward the political perspective as a prevalent function. The use of other 
denominations is still an indication of the heterogeneity of practices found in 
parliaments: “Sindicatura” (Andorra), “Bureau” (Senate of Belgium), “Directiva” 
(Bolivia), “Secretary General” (Slovenia e Estonia), “Office Commission” 
(Finland), “Comisión Permanente” (Guatemala), “Committee on Rules and 
Administration” (Japan). 
Looking at the parliament’s structures we also see huge heterogeneities. 
There are elected boards (as Argentina and Brazil), and boards composed by 
members from other parts of the government, such as Belgium (composed, 
among other members, by the presidents of the political groups representing 
permanent commissions). In countries of parliamentary tradition, such as 
Canada, the board is composed by the Speaker, and by two other members 
of the government, one member of the opposition (usually the leader of the 
opposition), and additional members in order to ensure a balance between 
government and opposition representatives (distributive justice). The main 
tenets of the distributive justice can also be applied to ensure the representation 
of the minorities in presidential systems, such as the Brazilian case.
There are boards with generic competences (i.e. the United Kingdom, Costa 
Rica, Austria), and boards with specific competences (i.e. Brazil, Croatia, Finland). 
In the Brazilian case, specific functions are dedicated to certain members of the 
board (first secretariat, second vice presidency etc).
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Table 1 – Boards: composition and size
Country
                   Legislative House
Composition of 
the Board
Size of the 
Board







Chamber of Deputies or 
equivalents
Germany X 69 11
Andorra X 4 14
Argentina X 4 2
Bolivia X 7 5
Bosnia e Herzegovina X 9 21
Canada X 7 2
Costa Rica X 3 5
Croatia X 6 4
Slovenia X 14 16
Estonia
Finland X 7 4
France X 22 4
Ghana X 6 3
Guatemala X 9 6
Ireland X 11 7
Luxemburg X 11 18
Macedonia X
Portugal X 9 4
United Kingdom X 6 1
Senates or equivalents
Germany X 69
Belgium X 17 24
Byelorussia X 7 11
Bosnia e Herzegovina X 9 60
Canada - Senate X 15 14
Chile X 7 18
Ireland X 11 18
Italy b X 20 6
Japan X 25 10
Source: Developed by the authors. 
a. Values rounded. b. Data about the Italian Senate consulted on its website.  c. MP – member of Parliament.
The analysis of the competences of the boards reveals diversity. Some 
demonstrates competencies exclusively dedicated to political activities. 
Other demonstrate only administrative competences, and, yet, other hybrid 
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competences between administrative and political. The authors has classified 
independently the competences and later on checked classifications, in order to 
reduce subjectivity. Some samples of administrative competences: “Under the 
Parliament of Canada Act, the Board has legal authority to “act on all financial 
and administrative matters respecting the House of Commons, its premises, its 
services and its staff; and the Members of the House of Commons”; “The structure, 
composition of staff, titles of positions and support staff positions, salary scale and 
salary rates of the Chancellery of the Riigikogu shall be established by the Board 
of the Riigikogu”, “The Secretary of Parliament shall direct the Parliamentary Staff 
Service and administer its operations, and adopt the Rules of Internal Conduct for 
the Parliamentary Staff Service”. Samples of political competences: “The Secretary 
of Parliament, as needed, assists the Speaker of Parliament in the preparation of 
parliamentary sessions”; “The Board also approves the statutes of the Chancellery 
of the Riigikogu establishing rights and main functions of the Chancellery of the 
Riigikogu, and the organisation of management and the competence of structural 
units thereof”; “Standing Order 148(2) further require that when the Board has 
reached a decision concerning any budget presented to it, the Speaker shall lay 
upon the Table the record of the Board’s decision”.
Administrative competences are sometime presented in generic form (i.e. 
Senate of Canada: the committee is responsible for the good internal management 
of the Senate. Good internal management meaning a proficient management, 
flexible, fair and transparent; with appropriate policies and programs; adequate 
levels of quality including high qualified personnel, appropriate and regular 
accountability mechanisms). Others are presented in details (the case of Brazilian 
Legislative Assemblies and Municipal Chambers). Ireland represents a situation in 
which the Board has only administrative competencies, however of strategic level: 
the role of the Commission is strategic instead of operational. The Parliament 
daily activities are of responsibility of the General-Secretariat and its staff. 
From the Chamber of Deputies or similar, seven (28%) did not declared the 
existence of Directorate Board or equivalent. In some of these cases they indicated 
all representatives as member of the directorate body (i.e. Republic of Maldives). 
Other indicated the centralization of all competences in the hands of the President 
(i.e. Bulgaria). Eight declared that the Directorate Board or equivalent is comprised 
by representatives and member of other nature, such as civil servants. Seventeen 
declared that the directorate board is exclusive composed by representatives. 
There are the cases in which the general-secretariat is member of the board, but 
he/she is not a representative, and this office is filled as a result of a mandate (i.e. 
Estonia). In five parliaments, the Directorate Board or equivalent is composed by 
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more than 10% of the total of members being Bosnia and Herzegovina located 
at the superior limit whose Board is composed by 21% of the members of the 
parliament.
Canada’s Senate stands out as the only example of the category in which 
representatives compose the Directorate Board alongside with member of other 
nature in one board of 15 members. A prima facie comparison with the board of 
the representative reveal that in Senate Houses the boards are larger in which the 
percentage varies from 6% to 60%. In this way, only 49% of the variation in the 
number of member of the board is explained by the variation in the number of 
representatives, as Table 2 demonstrates.












r = 0.702935 (1)
p < 0,05
0.494118
Source: Developed by the authors.
(1) No-normal Distribution (p < 0,05 –Shapiro-Wilk’s test); Spearman rank Coefficient. (2) Normal Distribution (p 
>= 0,05 – Shapiro-Wilk’s test); Pearson’s Coefficient. Nota. In these cases, p value is the probability of the value 
of the correlation coefficient (r) is random. Small p values indicate r is statistically significant. Bold: data with 
statistical significance. Strong Correlation: 0,70 a 0,89; very strong correlation: 0,9 a 1.
Besides the average size of the parliaments do not contribute to the clarification 
of the house’s functioning, curiously its value [14,36] is still among the group called 
sympathetic9. It involves for instance to ask individuals to remember someone 
whose death has caused great pain for them [11-12], or to friends and fellows with 
whom they have had contact once in a while [10-15] (Dunbar, 1998, p.77). For 
Dunbar (1998, p. 77), “it is striking that groups of this size are common in situations 
where very close co-ordination of behaviour is required: juries, the inner cabinets of 
many governments, the number of apostles, the size of most sport teams”. 
Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) pointed out as another problem the 
fact that structures of governance are highly endogenous, besides the fact that 
the need for the existence of the boards is endogenous (interregnums, parliament 
in vigilando). In the case of the parliaments, the endogeneity issue is yet more 
crucial. In the great majority of the cases, boards are exclusively composed by 
9 Sympathy group, the number of people with which an individual can simultaneously have an empathic strong 
relationship, which means, for Dunbar (1998) people that you know intimately and that you would feel very sorry 
for anything that affect them.
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representatives and when they are increased in number, these members come 
from the administrative sphere. The good practice of governance in the private 
sector suggests the need for the “independent councilor”, having as a starting point 
the premises values of autonomy and freedom. Nonetheless, for its own specificity 
and being a mixed-body in charge of political and administrative conduction, and 
the issue of members being elected by peers, it would be unusual having a board 
composed exclusively by external members. 
Model 
La Porta et al. (1998) suggested the influence of the legal and juridical tradition 
of one country (consuetudinary and positive) on the board functioning. In many 
studies about administrative boards, scholars try to understand if the role and 
structure of them impact organizational performance. In the case of parliaments, 
according to conceptual aspects presented as well as by the fact that there are 
no consentaneous productivity parameters for assessing their performance, we 
advocated towards an assessment model in which we are able to figure out in 
what extent the board has its role more focused on management or on the political 
leadership.
In this line of thinking, the assessments provided by the authors, which have 
been done according to the procedures described in the method section, we have 
the results presented on Table 3. Aiming to balance the occasional deviations of 
the amount of competences, which is likely to vary across parliaments, we used the 
weighted average in each perspective (administrative and political) for defining the 
parameters of the model. The result is presented in Figure 1.
Table 3 – The average of the scores for each competency
Country Amount of Competences
Average
Adm. Pol.
Andorra 6 0,36 0,64
Austria 1 0,33 0,67
Byelorussia 12 0,17 0,72
Bolivia 5 0,20 0,80
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 0,33 0,00
Brazil – Chamber of Deputies 29 0,28 0,72
Brazil – Senate 30 0,00 1,00
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Country Amount of Competences
Average
Adm. Pol.
Bulgaria 2 0,33 0,67
Canada Chamber 9 0,63 0,37
Canada Senate 3 0,33 0,44
Chile 4 0,96 0,04
Costa Rica 3 0,28 0,72
Croatia 13 0,33 0,67
Slovenia 15 0,43 0,48
Estonia 2 0,58 0,42
Finland 9 0,63 0,30
France 3 0,44 0,56
Guatemala 6 0,39 0,61
Ireland 11 0,33 0,67
Italy 5 0,27 0,73
Japan 1 0,33 0,67
Luxemburg 3 0,72 0,28
Poland 2 0,33 0,67
United Kingdom 3 0,33 0,67




Source: Data Analysis, developed by the authors.
Interestingly, the Hybrid quadrant stands out parliaments of whose countries 
adopt the parliamentary system of government or constitutional monarchy 
(commonly ruled by an oligarchical parliamentary) in which the prime minister is 
the presiding and actual head of the government and head of the executive branch. 
A parliamentary system is a system of democratic governance of a state in which the 
executive branch derives its democratic legitimacy from, and is held accountable 
to, the legislature (parliament); the executive and legislative branches are thus 
interconnected. Based on that, it is reasonable to think that a parliamentary scenario 
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tend to balance political and administrative dimensions in the parliament. This fact 
constitutes a possible explanation for the prevalence of parliamentary systems in 
the Hybrid quadrant.
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Source: Data analysis, developed by the authors.
In presidential systems, the executive branch is independent of the legislature. 
While in the parliamentary system the executive branch arises from the correlation 
of forces among the parties elected to Parliament, in presidentialism the executive 
branch is derived from the direct election of the president by the citizens. 
Agreements among parties (usually in order to hold positions in government) and 
alliances between political forces (hardly around ideas or programs) to achieve 
certain goals are common practice in this system of government. Especially in 
multiparty systems, in which there are more than two relevant parties vying for 
election and occupying seats in Congress, hardly the President’s party will have an 
ample majority in parliament to approve its projects and implement its policies. The 
political observer Fernando Henrique Cardoso hit the fly when he said that, however 
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well it has been voted President-elect its electoral capital (“votes”) must be the next 
day, converted into political capital (“support”). This phenomenon seems to require 
a more politicized role of parliament, as it highlights the political dimension, which 
corroborates the fact that presidential systems prevail in the Politicized quadrant. 
Final thoughts
If Parliaments are institutions scarcely studied in its institutional specificities, 
the parliamentary system of governance is therefore practically unknown in 
the academic milieu. This article has relevance because it intends to propose 
considerations about the governance in the Legislative Power, and for so doing from 
a cross-sectional investigation involving different realities. 
In this study, we present an attempt of dialoguing with the field of institutional 
theory with some emphasis on the literature on corporate governance. Starting 
from this literature review we identified similarities and differences between 
private sector corporate governance, and the governance of the Legislative Power. 
The main difference we found is the reference to the ‘common being’ as ethic-
normative framework in the decision-making process of parliamentary boards. In 
the area of legislative houses, the endeavor for defining this common being is of 
great complexity, and it is almost impossible to have a clear definition of it. The 
principal is almost a myth. Accomplishing a unitary will from the debacle of the 
predetermined desires (aspirations of several different political parties) is a very 
hard task. Many times what does happen is the prevalence of a no-consensual 
decision of the majority over the minority will. 
The methodological approach used a comparative and quantitative strategy in 
which some qualitative procedures where used as well. The findings reveal great 
heterogeneities demonstrating that each parliament comes up with a specific 
solution for its governance problems. Such heterogeneity suggests that the right 
question is not “how is the perfect board”, but, yes, “how parliaments can evolve 
in the configuration and functioning of its directorate boards.” There is a need for 
speculating that the role of the governance system is to ensure that the agents 
fulfill the wishes of the principal with loyalty and diligence. We also assume that 
the proposed model encompasses the fact that there is not optimal solution for the 
board, in the extent that the structures of governance involve a given type of board, 
which functions according to some paradigm, with a peculiar system for allocating 
benefits and having to be responsive to the whole set of stakeholders.
From the finds we developed a two-dimensions model for the classification 
of the parliamentary boards. The majority of the boards were classified in the 
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managerial quadrant, demonstrating strong connection between those boards and 
the finalistic dimension of the parliaments, i.e. its political perspective (legislative 
process + political-partisan articulation). The parliamentary boards of Croatia, the 
United Kingdom, Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland, Japan and Poland were classified in 
the hybrid quadrant, demonstrating balance between political and administrative 
activities. The boards of Brazil (Senate and the Chamber of Deputies), Bolivia, Italy 
and Byelorussia were seen as “politicized”, i.e. a situation in which the board besides 
its political competences also exerts administrative competences. Such practices is 
not recommended by the literature about corporate governance, for which it is 
most adequate that a body with the role of a administration board carries on more 
strategic functions and less closer to the organizations routine. 
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